Microcredit for Women: Kerala-style by McFarland, Joan
85
Atlantis, Volume 29.1, Fall/Winter 2004
Microcredit for Women: 
Kerala-style
Joan McFarland 
ABSTRACT
The paper presents a case study of microcredit for women in the state of Kerala, India. Although the microcredit movement has been
challenged by the left for its adoption of a banking model, in Kerala, banking practices have not generally been adopted and, contrary to
the model, local government plays a major role in delivery. However, with regard to feminist questioning of the ability of microcredit to
meaningfully empower women, it is the case in Kerala that women's empowerment, although accepted as a goal in microcredit projects, does
not extend to what we may call "gender empowerment."
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article présente une étude de cas du micro-crédit pour les femmes dans l'état de Kerala, en Inde. Quoique que le mouvement de micro-
crédit ait été mis en question par la gauche pour avoir adopté un modèle de service bancaire à Kerala, les pratiques bancaires n'ont
généralement pas été adoptées, et, contrairement au modèle, le gouvernement local joue un rôle important à sa mise en œuvre. Cependant,
en ce qui concerne le questionnement féministe de la capacité du micro-crédit à donner plus de pouvoir aux femmes, il est dans le cas au
Keral l'émancipation des femmes, quoiqu' accepté comme un objectif dans les projets de micro-crédit, il ne s'étend pas à ce que nous pouvons
appeler l'émancipation des sexes.
Microcredit, defined as "the process of making
financial services such as savings and credit available to the
poor who lack access to formal banking institutions"
(Rajasekhar 2000, 76), has spread everywhere.  A recent1
World Bank report (1999) stated that 30 million
micro-loans were being distributed worldwide every year
and increasing at a rate of 30-40% per year (Blackstock
1999, 1). The Microcredit Summit Campaign claims that,
by the end of 2002, 2572 microcredit institutions had made
loans to 67,606,080 clients (2003, 16). The Campaign's
goal, endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in
1997, is to reach the level of 100 million micro-loans by the
year 2005 (Microcredit Summit 1997, 5). 
The pioneers of microcredit are: the
Self-employed Women of India (SEWA), Women's World
Banking and the Grameen Bank, formed in the 1970s (Rose
1992; Williams 1987; Yunus 2000). In the Grameen Bank
model, small groups of women meet weekly to collect
savings and loan payments and the group itself acts as
collateral for loans. This has become the most popularized
version of microcredit.
Microcredit goes almost exclusively to women
because it has been shown that women have nearly perfect
payback rates and that they spend any money gained on
family needs, which has not always been the case with
loans to men (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996, 46). It is because
of this record of women's performance that microcredit has
been adopted by the Microcredit Summit, the World Bank,
the United Nations and others as a major tool for the
elimination of world poverty (Microcredit Summit 2002,
2).
However, microcredit is not without its critics.
The microcredit movement has adopted a "banking model"
or what are called "best practices" in order for projects to
become self-financing and self-sustaining (Issac et al 2002,
6-7; Morduch 2000, 620). Hence, with microcredit, no
subsidies are given, high interest rates are charged and
minimal support services are provided. Furthermore,
microcredit projects must achieve scale. For example, the
World Bank's microcredit body, The Consultative Group to
Assist the Poorest (CGAP), will not lend to projects with
less than 5000 beneficiaries.  That the model is a private2
sector one with government kept at arm's length is also of
significance. For all of these reasons, the adoption of a
banking model by the movement has led to charges of
private profit-making on the backs of the poor (Issac et al
2002, 7; Scully nd, 2; Singh et al 1997, 1).
The involvement of the World Bank in
microcredit through CGAP and the Microcredit Summits
which it sponsors has led to the further charge that
microcredit may just be an "addition to the arsenal" in the
Bank's Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) (Aslam 1996,
2; Singh et al 1997, 2). The evidence cited includes policy
reforms advocated by CGAP such as the privatization of
micro-lending institutions, stronger debt collection laws
specifically regarding collateral, and the call for the repeal
of usury laws to allow the higher rates of interest that the
advocates of "best practices" recommend. It is pointed out
that microcredit, by its very nature, will not lead to
structural change (Mayoux 2001, 264); in fact, the case is
quite the reverse. With its market principles as represented
in "best practices" and its privatization of assistance to the
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poor, it acts to further advance the corporate globalization
model (Morduch 2000, 624; Scully nd, 2; Singh et al 1997,
2). 
Feminist critics focus attention on whether
microcredit does anything for the empowerment of women
or whether it just adds to women's already heavy work
burden (Murthy nd, 2-3; Scully nd, 2). They ask how
minimalist programs without support services can possibly
lead to women's empowerment (Mayoux 2001, 266;
Milgram 2002, 109). Further, they question whether a
woman would always be able to retain control over a loan
without it being appropriated by male members of the
family (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996, 52). Moreover, it is
noted that microcredit programs were originally designed
by men, led by men in a top-down fashion and have been
executed largely by male field workers - at least in the
Grameen Bank model. Finally, feminist critics remind us
that few resources, in relative terms, are being spent on
microcredit. For example, the $30 million contribution by
the World Bank to CGAP's core fund is less than
two-tenths of one percent of the amount that the Bank
disbursed to developing countries in 1996 (Aslam 1997, 3).
Feminists charge that the loans going to women are small
in individual and overall amounts, while men still get the
mega funds.  Even the funds being devoted to microcredit3
may be just a diversion of funds away from other programs
that would meet more of women's needs and hence lead to
their greater empowerment (Mayoux 2001, 245).
To explore these issues, I turn to Kerala, a state
in southwest India, where I visited women and development
projects in November-December 2001. Using material I
gathered and evidence from other studies, I discuss the
form that microcredit is taking in the state, where the spread
of microcredit is certainly evident. However, the banking
model has only been adopted by a minority of projects.
Empowerment of various types is emphasized - but not
gender empowerment. The local government plays a central
role in microcredit in Kerala, which presents both unique
possibilities and unique challenges.
MICROCREDIT IN KERALA: 
A CASE STUDY
Perhaps the most unique aspect about Kerala is
the government. In 1957, Kerala was the first state
anywhere in the world to have a democratically elected
communist government. The government only lasted one
year, but since that time a number of leftist coalition
governments have been in power. In recent years, partly in
response to India's Ninth National Plan (1997-2002) and
partly on its own initiative, Kerala's left coalition
government has launched a decentralizing "People's
Campaign." While the national government increased the
percentage of its state development grants going to local
government bodies (panchayats) from 5% to 40%, in
Kerala, 10% of that was set aside for women's programs
(Eapen 2001, 13-16) . 
With an emphasis on social welfare, Kerala takes
pride in high levels of education and health for women.4
For example, female literacy rates in Kerala are 86%
compared to 39% in India as a whole. Kerala's female life
expectancy is 74 years compared to 59 years for India as a
whole. In addition, Kerala is the only state in India where
the ratio of females to males in the population is greater
than one. In Kerala there are 104 females in the population
for every 100 males, while in India as a whole the ratio is
93 to 100 ("Comparative data" 2000, 1).        
     However, while these gains have been achieved
for women, Kerala society is still a very conservative one in
gender terms. For example, it is culturally prohibited for
women to be out on their own after around six in the
evening. Though unwritten, the rule is strictly observed and
results in disrespectful if not abusive treatment for women,
even foreigners, who ignore it. Such restrictions present an
almost insurmountable barrier for female field workers.
One New Delhi woman working in a NGO in Kerala whom
I interviewed was transferring to another state for just this
reason. She had run into problems when she tried to do her
fieldwork, yet she could not do her job without being able
to travel.
In India, microcredit groups are called self-help
groups or SHGs. SHGs came onto the scene in Kerala in
the 1990s. The three main types of SHGs in Kerala,
depending on the sponsoring body, are church-based
(Christian), NGO-based (non-government organizations)
and panchayat-based (local government).  Ninety-eight5 
percent of the participants in the SHGs are women (Anand
2002, 8). During the 1980s and early 1990s, some
church-based and NGO-based agencies were already
providing credit through credit unions but, in the
mid-nineties, the mode of delivery was converted to SHGs.
Most of the new NGO-based SHGs were also formed in the
mid-nineties. They are mostly local although some of them
have international backing. The panchayat-based SHGs
have several origins. They emerged from neighbourhood
groups (NHGs) formed in 1993 under the Community
Development Society (CDS) model, originally partly
funded by UNICEF and implemented in one district of
Kerala (Alappuzha). Almost all of the women's NHGs
became microcredit groups. Under the People's Plan, the
state decentralization plan of 1996-2001, and the state's
poverty elimination plan called Kudumbashree - both based
on the CDS model - the number of women's NHGs has
multiplied and the plan is to extend the model to the whole
state over a ten year period. Another type of
panchayat-based SHG emerged in the late 1990s with the
introduction of the 10% Women's Component Plan (WCP)
funding mentioned earlier.
MICROCREDIT PROJECTS I VISITED6
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Two of the microcredit projects I visited are
church-based, both part of the Syrian Christian church. One
covers several districts in the south of Kerala and the other
in the central western part. Formerly, the lending had been
through credit unions but now it is through SHGs. They use
the small group style with staff trained in social work. The
programs are large. By 2001, the southern-based one had
organized 1,200 SHGs while the centrally-based one had
organized 325. Each group has 10-20 members, which
represents a total of 12,000-24,000 and 3,250-6,500 women
respectively. The women, drawn from other religions as
well as Christianity, are mostly married women previously
neither employed nor self-employed. Funding for the
projects is through the church and other donors and, in the
case of the centrally located one, bilateral aid as well.
A third microcredit project I visited, located in a
rural area in the central eastern part of the state, is
sponsored by a locally-based NGO and modelled directly
on the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. Founded in 1996 by
a professor returning home after many years in the United
States, the project had organized, by the end of 2001, over
1000 women. The women meet weekly in Grameen-style
groups. However, the meetings are not  "formal" and
"ritualistic" like the Grameen Bank meetings, since the
founder judges that aspect to be "inappropriate" in the
Kerala context.  All of the loans made to the women must7
be for income-generating activities - the purchase of a cow
to produce milk both for the family and for sale being the
most popular choice for such an activity. Initial funding for
the project was provided by the founder, who is now
director of the project. Subsequent funding has come from
the Grameen Foundation, Women's World Banking, SIDBI
(an Indian government funder) and, in small amounts, from
private donors, mainly in Germany and the United States.
Virtually all of the funding is obtained on a loan basis.
FINDINGS FROM KERALA
In discussing the Keralan case, I draw both from
my own observations and from findings in several other
studies. The studies include one by Jaya S. Anand which
provides a detailed analysis of three projects: a
church-based one, an NGO-based one, and a CDS
panchayat-based one, and another which is a proposal for
a new panchayat-based project called "The Mararikulum
Experiment" by T.M. Thomas Issac et al (Anand 2002;
Issac et al 2002). I will discuss, in turn, evidence on the
spread of microcredit in Kerala, the use of a "non-banking"
model, the goal of women's empowerment as it is
interpreted in Kerala, the unique aspects of the Kerala case
because of the central role of local government in
microcredit and, finally, the important question of the
sustainability of Kerala's microcredit projects. 
SPREAD
The spread of SHGs in Kerala is attributed by
Anand to the fact that SHGs are seen as a sure remedy:
"There is a general tendency to consider SHGs a panacea
for all ills of the rural community. This is evident from the
mushroom growth of self-help groups in the State" (2002,
8). The growth of bank-linked SHGs in Kerala, where the
eligibility for bank-linkage is on thrift criteria, is one kind
of evidence on microcredit's spread (Anand 2002, 18-19).
Between 1994-95 and 1999-2000, the number of SHGs,
represented by 47 agencies and almost all NGO-based,
increased from 352 to 2434, a seven-fold increase, and the
funds dispersed from Rs. 3.02 lakh to Rs. 565.48 lakh
(lakh=100,000). This growth made Kerala, in 1999-2000,
the third largest state in the country in terms of number of
banked-linked groups and meant that Kerala held 13% of
the country's total of such groups.   
There is also documentation on the size and
growth of women's NHGs in the Malappuram district. In
September 2000, there were 4645 in 96 panchayats (Anand
2002, 26). In 2002, there were 1500 in just eight of the
panchayats. Of these, only 7% were in existence during
June 2000, 40% were formed between June and December
2000 - immediately after the panchayats were included in
the Kudumbashree program, another 27% between January
and June 2001, and the rest, 27%, in the next twelve month
period or so (Issac et al, 2002, 14-15). 
A NON-BANKING MODEL
Anand downplays the banking version of
microcredit. He takes the position that SHGs are more
about empowerment than microcredit (2002, 51). Further,
he argues that where microcredit per se is involved, it is the
thrift component, not the income generating activity aspect,
which is important. He calls the former "the most striking
advantage of SHGs" (2002, 65). In his March 2000 survey,
fewer than 50% of the participants interviewed had taken
up income generating activities: specifically this included
only 33% of the church-based project participants, 55% of
the NGO-based project participants, and 42% of the
panchayat-based groups' participants. Anand presents the
further evidence that in September 2000, of the 4645 NHGs
in the Malappuram district, only 986, or 21.2%, had
received bank-linked microcredit funding. 
A survey of office bearers in the Kudumbashree
women's NHGs done at the end of 2001 provides a similar
picture. Only 7% of respondents named "credit" as the
primary motivation for the formation of their groups.
"Poverty eradication," "co-operation," "area development"
and "women's empowerment" were all ranked above
"credit" as motivating factors (Issac et al 2002, 15).
In addition, Anand finds that in Kerala, unlike in
the Grameen Bank groups in Bangladesh or in Myrada
groups in the Indian state of Karnataka, banking norms are
only followed in a limited way (2002, 47). For example, he
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found that subsidies are given despite the fact that the
women are told that none are available (37). Further, he
observed that CDS groups, in the case of a default on loan
repayment, took no legal action: "They [the group leaders]
feel that this may push them [the defaulters] into deep
financial crisis and ultimately [in]to the hands of
moneylenders. So fresh loans are given (in extreme cases)
for repaying the old loan" (57). However, that is not to say
that the banking model might not be adopted in the future.
Anand claims that attitudes are changing and women are
realizing "that subsidies cannot, by themselves, make any
permanent change in their lifestyles" (68).
Given the vision of the church-based groups "to
create a more humane and just society based on gospel
values, empowerment and grassroots participation"
(Rajasekhar 2000, 79), it is hardly surprising that they
would also be following a "non-banking" model. In their
projects, there is little lending for income generating
projects. The savings aspect is stronger and those savings
are being used mostly for consumption and other purposes.
At one meeting I attended, the women announced the use
of their pooled savings to purchase new saris.  
There are some interesting examples of resistance
by the women themselves to the banking model. Some
groups did not take any external financing because they felt
that "the money they raised should not be lost in the form
of payment on external borrowings" (Anand 2002, 41). In
another instance, some of the CDS and church-based
participants who were labourers rejected the income
generating activities proposed in their groups, saying that
"they couldn't afford to give up their work and wages"
(Anand 2002, 53). 
There are exceptions, however, to the general
non-banking pattern. The local NGO-based project I
visited, modelled on the Grameen Bank, is one of these. In
that project, following the Grameen Bank model, all of the
funds that the women receive are loans and all of the loans
must be used for income generating projects. There are,
literally, no subsidies. The local NGO that Anand studied
would also be an exception, although perhaps to a lesser
extent. 
Although most Kerala SHGs do not follow a
strict banking model, in the proposal for "The Mararikulum
Experiment," such non-adoption is taken a step further. The
banking model - at least the World Bank one - is explicitly
rejected. The aim is to find an alternative to "the SHGs
espoused by the World Bank in their profit oriented and
NGO-led model" (Issac et al 2002, 14). The authors present
a devastating critique of that model but conclude that the
adoption of microcredit is probably "inevitable" given that
it has penetrated everywhere (2002, 1). Their proposal for
the Mararikulum Experiment, to run from 2002-2005, calls
for a microcredit model that is far different from the World
Bank one. In their model, emphasis is on group, not
individual, income generating activities (Anand 2002, 18,
28ff, 67), and "credit would just play a facilitating role"
(Issac et al 2002, 19-20).  The emphasis would be to8
combine SHGs with strong backward and forward linkages
into the community (2002, 10).
EMPOWERMENT
Empowerment is a goal in Kerala's SHGs but the
term has various interpretations. The range includes access
to credit, leadership, and social and political empowerment;
however, the interpretation does not seem to include a
feminist definition of empowerment nor what we might call
"gender empowerment."9
A study based on 1996 fieldwork in Kerala by D.
Rajasekhar links empowerment with access to credit
(Rajasekhar 2000). The study compares two projects, one
church-based and one NGO-based. The church-based one,
at the time, was using a credit union form of delivery. The
NGO-based one, however, was using the SHG form. Since
the ratio of loans to savings was much greater in the
NGO-based SHG project, the author concludes that it is the
"more successful" in "poverty alleviation and women's
empowerment" (2000, 92). He concludes that it was the
form of the project - the SHG form - leading to better
participation and hence better savings and credit that was
responsible for the former's greater success.
It should be noted that the author was not
concerned about whether the loans were used for income
generating activities, consumption or other purposes in his
evaluation of the empowerment potential of the credit. One
of his findings of note is that, in the church-based project,
some of the women were actually being "disempowered" in
that they were losing control of their loans to other family
members (Rajasekhar 2000, 86). This may have been due
to the project's credit union model of delivery, or it may
have been related to the greater size of the project - the
church-based one being very large as opposed to the
NGO-based one which was quite small (2000, 92).
Leadership training as a form of empowerment is
stressed in a number of the projects. I noted this in the three
big projects that I visited. In the church-based projects,
activity seemed to be most lively and intense in the monthly
SHG leaders' workshops, several of which I observed. In
addition, one of the church-based projects organizes a
region-wide convention for women leaders yearly in which
some 1250 women had participated the previous year. In
the Grameen Bank-style project I visited, it was not only
SHG members who were being groomed for leadership but
also young, rural women staff members. The latter were
being sent off to Grameen Bank and Women's World
Banking workshops, in Bangladesh and Chennai, India
respectively.
Anand reports on instances of social
empowerment but notes a lack of gender empowerment or
the questioning of traditional gender roles. The women
showed their social empowerment by organizing a mass
rally to express concern about the distance they were
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having to travel for maternity services (2002, 62). After
raising the matter in their SHGs, the rally was organized
and they were successful in having the situation addressed.
Some groups had also initiated public campaigns against
illicit liquor and gambling (2002, 62). However, when it
came to challenging traditional gender roles, Anand found
that:
They continued to adhere to the traditional
culture and values. To the question whether
[they] preferred male dominance in the family
and society 48 percent answered in the
affirmative. A few opted for "gender balance"
rather than "gender equality." When asked about
gender equity and equality many of them opted to
remain neutral (38 percent). 
(Anand 2002, 62-63)
The Mararikulum Experiment proposal is harshly
critical of the "NGO approach" (e.g. the Grameen Bank
model approach) to empowerment, calling it "a conduit for
credit to the family" and a way of  "re-enforc(ing) the
traditional gender division of labour while at the same time
increas(ing) the burden and workload of women" (Issac et
al 2002, 7). The "alternative model" is designed to
transform women's NHGs into "genuine instruments of
women's empowerment" (2002, 19). It adopts not only the
goal of women's political empowerment which serves to
"help provide a basis from which women can actively
participate in the public realm"(2002, 14), but also uses
women's groups as a catalyst for the greater political
participation of the whole community "to solve the problem
of the sustainability of popular participation" (2002,
19-20). To accomplish this last goal, "a gender awareness
program for women and men" that is "linked to their daily
life experience" (2002, 20) is proposed, as well as a plan to
have general NHGs expanded into a form of women's
NHGs because of the greater success of the latter (2002,
19-20).
POLITICIZATION
One very positive aspect of the CDS
panchayat-based NHGs is that all of their members are
from "high risk" (for poverty) families whereas members of
other microcredit projects need not be (Anand 2002, 17).
Panchayat-based SHGs, however, do face challenges.
Important among these is that they are seen as "politicized,"
a concern that has been raised by sociologists in Kerala,
according to Anand (2002, 18), as well as by politicians
and the press.  10
Such "politicization" does seem to have been a
serious problem in the distribution of Women's Component
Plan funds. The director of the Grameen Bank model
project that I visited brought up the matter with me. He saw
the allocation of Women's Component Plan funds as
"politicized" and excluding those "not in the Party." His
project received no panchayat-based financial support.
Anand found that the church-based project he studied could
not get Women's Component Plan funding because the
agency in question was seen as being "promoted by a
particular community" (2002, 34). Even within CDS
groups, some felt that the major share of panchayat funds
went to politically affiliated persons (Anand 2002, 60). 
Besides the problem of access to funds, Anand
shows, in reference to the WCP-funded SHGs, how
"politics could kill a group": "Some of these groups are
formed without the thrift component...which itself is so
essential for the successful functioning of the SHG. These
groups have been formed even without conceptualizing the
essence of SHGs, merely for availing the funds made
available from the panchayat" (2002, 18). 
Despite the problems that have arisen around the
allocation of Women's Component Plan funds, the
Mararikulum Experiment proposal goes further in terms of
the role of the panchayat. It calls for all SHGs, whether
from the NGO sector, the church sector or any other sector,
to come under CDS panchayat co-ordination (Issac et al
2002,18-19). If the ratio of SHGs to NHGs in Mararikulum
is anything like that in Malappurum, then one-fourth of
SHGs (500 out of 2000 in Malappurum) would be
non-panchayat-based and thus affected by the change.
Efficiency, for example to avoid duplication and ensure
universal coverage, is the reason given for such integration,
but it is also admitted that there is "severe resistance" to this
plan from among the organizations supporting the
non-panchayat-based SHGs (Issac et al, 2002, 18). 
SUSTAINABILITY
The sustainability of Kerala's SHGs is an
important question. Since they are not following the
banking model, the SHGs do not, for the most part, have
financial sustainability. They are dependent on outside
funding, either state or non-state, for their continued
viability. In addition, there is the question of structural
sustainability. Anand found aspects of leadership to be
among the most serious problems in the SHGs he studied
(2002, 41). Not only was there an over-dependence on
successful leaders but also "second-line" leadership was not
being developed, with the same leaders being elected and
re-elected. Furthermore, there was a mistrust of leaders
based on a lack of transparency and an autocratic leadership
style (2002, 67).
The sustainability of the project based on the
Grameen Bank model that I visited is dependent upon the
superhuman effort and devotion of its present director who
founded it, runs it, fundraises for it, monitors it and
publicizes it. Currently he is trying to get 5000 participants
to meet the requirements for CGAP funding and has been
persuaded, by experience and by the literature, to offer
more support services to the women. Both of these
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initiatives stretch the project's resources even further.
Although he is trying to groom others to take over from him
someday, from my observation, he may be irreplaceable.
A great deal of the credit for the success of the
CDS projects in the Kudumbashree phase (1999 and
following) is given to the 20,000 volunteers - formerly
volunteers in the Literacy Mission of the early 1990s - who
assisted in their development (Anand 2002, 26). Hence the
sustainability of these projects, and possibly those in the
Mararikulum Experiment also, may be dependent on such
remarkable support from volunteers. 
In terms of barriers to success of SHGs in Kerala,
infrastructure, resources and support services have been
identified. The women in a survey of SHG participants
named "poor infrastructure" in the form of roads, bus and
ferry service, bridges and electricity as the main factors
preventing their success (Anand 2002, 48). The fact that
NGOs have inadequate resources to carry out their
monitoring functions is another major barrier (Anand 2002,
28). Finally, as noted in Anand's conclusion, the provision
of more support services to SHGs is crucial: "It has been
clearly established that delivering credit alone may not
produce the desired impact. The supporting services and
structures through which credit is delivered, ranging from
group formation and training to awareness-raising and a
wide range of other supporting measures are critical to
make the impact of group activity strong and sustainable"
(2002, 69-70).
CONCLUSION
Thus the Kerala case follows the world
microcredit pattern in some ways and is unique in others.
The spread of microcredit in the state has been dramatic.
Some parts of the Grameen Bank model such as the small
group organizational structure, are followed. However, the
presence of the World Bank and the Microcredit Summit
Campaign is not evident in Kerala. In terms of the banking
model, the "no subsidy" aspect has, in general, not been
adopted. Support services for the SHGs are lacking but this
may be based more on the lack of resources than on
principle. Women's empowerment through SHGs is a stated
goal, but its achievement is limited by the absence of the
societal changes that would be needed. As for the amount
of aid spending on microcredit, "small change" seems an
apt description. For example, the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) funds only one program that
offers microcredit in Kerala, while it has spent millions on
a power station in the district of Idukki and is currently
spending millions building a cancer hospital in the north of
the state.
What is truly unique about the Kerala case is the
major role of local government in microcredit. This is in
stark contrast to the banking model which shuns any
government involvement. Local government-based SHGs
have mushroomed in Kerala. The Mararikulum Experiment,
in explicitly rejecting the banking model and proposing an
alternative emphasizing co-operative group income
generating activities and political participation, is taking
Kerala's SHGs in a direction which is new not only for the
state but also for the larger microcredit community.
Whether such a plan can overcome the many challenges
facing it remains to be seen.
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ENDNOTES
1. In this paper, the terms microcredit and micro-finance will be used synonymously. As far as I can see, this is the case in the literature
although there might be a slight preference, although not consistently, for the banking community to use micro-finance and the development
community to use microcredit.
2. The number is based on information from the director of the NGO-based project that I visited in Kerala. He was given it by CGAP officials
when he was in New York City hoping to participate in the 2002 Microcredit Summit. In the end, he was not even able to attend the Summit
due to the prohibitive cost of registration, and of accommodation at the Hilton Hotel. Another formidable barrier to his participation was
the requirement placed on NGO participants for the submission of a detailed Institutional Action Plan (IAP).
3. This was being said among feminists at the UN Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. 
4. There has been considerable debate over the merits of "welfare versus growth" with regard to Kerala as a development model  for poor
countries. There are those, such as Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin (1990, 1998), who have put forward Kerala as such a model
- one that "indicates that economic growth is not a prerequisite for progress"(42) while others, such as Joseph Tharamangalam (1998a,
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1998b), describe "the development debacle of Kerala" (1998a, 23) and point out what they see as the implications of Kerala's stagnation,
even deceleration of growth.
5. Kerala is 24% Christian, 50% Hindu and 24% Muslim and is the state with the highest percentage of Christians in India. All of the
church-based SHGs I came across were Christian.
6. I did visit other women and development projects in Kerala including a women's centre, a Gandhi inspired community, an environmental
NGO very active in the state's decentralization campaign, and the world head office for fisherpeople. While none of these projects was able
to provide microcredit, they were all either participating in, or monitoring, microcredit groups. This further convinced me of the
pervasiveness of microcredit in Kerala.
7. Among the "ritualistic" aspects of the Grameen Bank groups is the recitation, at each meeting, of "sixteen decisions"- promises by the
women such as "We shall follow and advance the four principles of Grameen Bank- Discipline, Unity , Courage and Hard Work- in all walks
of our lives" (Hashemi et al 1996, 651). The director did not give an exact reason for the position he took on these but his reasoning might
be that on the one hand, Bangladesh society is even more conservative than Kerala society with respect to women's role and on the other
hand, from his observation of the recitation of the "sixteen decisions," they did not seem very meaningful.
8. In a recent document, these group activities are referred to as "women-owned co-operatives" (Franke 2003).
9. A feminist definition of empowerment in this context offered by Linda Mayoux is quoted in Milgram (2002, 11): "In the feminist
empowerment approach, microfinance responds to the immediate practical needs of poor informal sector workers, but it is regarded as only
part of the strategy for the wider social and political empowerment of women through social mobilization and advocacy around issues of
gender equity at the macrolevel." The DAWN (Development Alternatives for Women in a New Era) concept of "self-empowerment for
women" is also similar to "gender empowerment" as it is used here (Mosse 1993, 171). 
10. A recent incident over the Mararikulum Experiment involved the charge, in the press, that Issac's American research associates, Richard
W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin, had links with the CIA. Both Franke and Issac, who is the leader of the Communist Party of India
(Marxist) in Kerala, vehemently denied these charges. Issac called them part of a "political conspiracy" against him and the People's Plan
Campaign (The Hindu July 15, 2003). 
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